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Values and epistemological understanding 
Salla Ahola 
The significance of values in understanding the ways people think and behave has been 
demonstrated in a wide range of studies (for a review, see Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Values 
convey what is important to individuals in their lives (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). Different 
values have different motivating goals (Schwartz, 1992). For example, the central goals of 
self-direction values include independent thought and action, whereas respecting and 
preserving the existing customs are central to tradition values. Are values significant also in 
guiding individuals’ stance towards knowledge and knowing, i.e., their personal 
epistemology? The main aim of the present study is to address this question.  
Values 
Values have been given a variety of definitions by different theorists (Rohan, 2000). In 
this paper, values are conceptualised using the Schwartz (1992) model, because it has been 
widely used in social psychological research and has gained much empirical support 
(Schwartz, 2012; Schwartz et al., 2001). Schwartz (1992, p. 4) has defined the concept of 
values based on the existing literature as follows: “Values (1) are concepts or beliefs, (2) 
pertain to desirable end states or behaviors, (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide 
selection or evaluation of behavior or events, and (5) are ordered by relative importance.” 
Regarding the content of values, the Schwartz (1992) theory suggests that values can be 
divided into 10 distinct motivational value types that are recognized across the cultures 
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(Table 1).  
According to the theory (Schwartz, 1992), the value types are dynamically related to 
each other. Acting in line with one value type may be compatible or in conflict with acting in 
line with other value types depending on the psychological, practical, and social 
consequences of the value types in question. In the circular value structure depicted in Figure 
1, the competing value types are located on the opposing sides and the compatible value types 
are located close to each other. 
 
Table 1 
Value types and their motivational goals (based on Schwartz, 1992) 
Self-direction: independent thought and action  
Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life  
Hedonism: pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself  
Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards, 
thereby obtaining social approval  
Power: attainment of social status and prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources  
Security: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self  
Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate 
social expectations or norms  
Tradition: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one’s culture or religion 
impose on the individual  
Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact  
Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and 
for nature  
 
Schwartz (1992) clarified the structural relations of values by introducing four higher 
order value types arranged to two dimensions. The first dimension is called openness to 
change–conservation, and it opposes stimulation and self-direction values to security, 
conformity and tradition values. In the second dimension, self-enhancement–self-
transcendence, power and achievement values contradict universalism and benevolence 
values. Hedonism is considered as belonging both to openness to change and self-
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enhancement.  
 
 
Figure 1. The value structure. Image from ESS EduNet, NSD, by Schwartz 
(http://essedunet.nsd.uib.no/cms/topics/1/1/2.html) 
 
Further, according to Schwartz (1992), the value structure should manifest itself in a 
sinusoid pattern of associations between values and other variables. For example, an external 
variable that correlates positively with self-direction is expected to correlate positively also 
with the values adjacent to self-direction. Moreover, correlations with this external variable 
should decrease going around the structure in both directions to security values. Research 
supports this model of basic human values. Both the content (10 value types) and the 
structure (the relations between values) has gained much support (Schwartz, 2012; Schwartz 
et al., 2001), and thus the model is close to universal (for departures from the proposed values 
structure, see Steinmetz, Isidor, & Baeuerle, 2012). 
Wach and Hammer (2003) have made an important extension to the Schwartz (1992) 
model by introducing two truth-related value types, namely rational truth and non-rational 
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truth. These opposing values represent two sides of the truth. The motivating goals of rational 
truth are theoretical, logical and predictable truth, whereas belief in non-rational truth, magic, 
intuitiveness, fatalism and denial of rationality are characteristic of non-rational truth. 
According to Wach and Hammer’s (2003) hypotheses, rational truth would be located 
between self-direction and universalism, and non-rational truth between power and security. 
In their studies conducted in six European countries, Wach and Hammer (2003) found that 
rational truth was located closest to self-direction with self-transcendence values 
(universalism and benevolence) also adjacent to it. Therefore, they suggest that rational truth 
might be considered a sub-type for self-direction. They studied non-rational truth only in 
France and found that it emerged closest to security, between security and power.  
On the basis of Wach and Hammer’s (2003) theory and observations concerning the two 
truth-related value types, it is hypothesised that rational truth is located closest to self-
direction, between self-direction and universalism (H1) and that non-rational truth is located 
closest to security, between security and power (H2). 
Epistemological understanding 
Despite the existing discrepancies in defining the construct of personal epistemology, 
many researchers would agree that personal epistemology refers to individuals’ conceptions 
about knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Pintrich, 2002), such as beliefs about 
the certainty of knowledge, the simplicity of knowledge, the source of knowledge, and the 
justification for knowing (Pintrich, 2002). Most models describing personal epistemology can 
be categorised into two views: cognitive developmental and system of beliefs views (Hofer, 
2004). 
In this study, I adopt the cognitive developmental model of Kuhn, Cheney and 
Weinstock (2000). As most models on personal epistemology, also the Kuhn et al. (2000) 
model can be traced back to Perry (1970), who was the first to show the developmental 
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sequence of epistemological thinking. The aim of Kuhn et al. (2000) is to describe this 
sequence as simply as possible, both theoretically and empirically. They suggest that “the 
developmental task that underlies the achievement of mature epistemological understanding 
is the coordination of the subjective and objective dimensions of knowing” (Kuhn et al., 
2000, p. 310). In the course of this advancement knowledge claims are first seen as copies, 
then as facts, opinions, and lastly as judgements (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002). According to 
Kuhn and Weinstock (2002), this series of qualitatively distinct understandings of the nature 
of knowledge claims is the essential product of epistemological development.  
Kuhn et al. (2000) depict the development of epistemological understanding as a 
sequence of four levels: realist, absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist. At the absolutist (and 
also at the preabsolutist realist) level, knowledge is considered objective and certain. In the 
absolutist thought knowledge claims are facts that can be compared to the external reality in 
order to conclude whether they represent the reality correctly or incorrectly. At the multiplist 
level, which is the next level, objectivity is abandoned and knowledge is now seen as 
subjective and uncertain. Claims are considered subjective opinions that individuals generate 
themselves. As in multiplist thought there exist no objective criteria against which to evaluate 
opinions that different individuals hold, all opinions are regarded as equally right. The 
evaluativist reintegrates objectivity, but with a novel meaning: claims are now seen as 
judgements, and even though knowledge is regarded as uncertain, standards can still exist for 
evaluating different views. Two positions can both be right to some extent, but the positions 
can be compared and evaluated and one of them can be considered “more right” on the basis 
of argumentation and evidence presented to support it.  
In their model Kuhn et al. (2000) distinguish between different kinds of knowing 
judgement domains. Personal taste domain concerns judgements of pleasingness and the 
aesthetics domain concerns judgements of beauty. Further, the value domain pertains to 
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judgements of good. Finally, social truth domain refers to judgements of truth about the 
social world, whereas physical truth domain refers to judgements of truth about the physical 
world. Kuhn et al. recognize the possibility of other categorisations, but do not explain the 
basis for choosing these particular domains.  
Generally, educational level and experience have appeared as important factors in 
fostering epistemological development, and more so than age (for a review, see Weinstock, 
Neuman, & Glassner, 2006). Some of the studies using Kuhn et al.’s (2000) model and its 
associated quantitative instrument to measure epistemological understanding have provided 
support for seeing the model as a developmental one, especially regarding the first transition 
from absolutism to multiplism. The proportion of those who have achieved this transition has 
been found to be larger among the more highly educated people (Kuhn et al., 2000; Mason, 
Boldrin, & Zurlo, 2006) although this progression is more like a trend than a linear 
progression across the grade levels (see also Weinstock et al., 2006). However, some studies 
(Wang, Zhou, & Shen, 2014; Weinstock & Zviling-Beiser, 2009) have found no associations 
between educational level and epistemological level. One possible explanation for these 
inconsistent findings could be that the impact of education on epistemological understanding 
as measured by the Kuhn et al. (2000) instrument might depend on the type and width of 
academic experience (including for example the type of curriculum) of the samples studied 
(Weinstock & Zviling-Beiser, 2009). For instance, Wang et al. (2014) observed that students 
from an experimental school were less absolutist and more multiplist than students from a 
regular school. However, as regards the evaluativist position, students from these two schools 
did not differ.  
Values and epistemological understanding 
Empirical studies examining the relationship between values and epistemological 
understanding are almost non-existent. A rare exception is a study by Kessels (2013) 
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conducted among 161 university students in Germany. However, it considered only two 
values, conformity and power. To measure epistemological understanding, Kessels used 
Krettenauer’s (2005) instrument (Fragebogen zur Erfassung des Entwicklungsniveaus 
epistemologischer Überzeugungen, FREE), in which respondents rate their agreement with 
different statements referring to conflicting viewpoints about twelve controversial issues, and 
to measure values, she used the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz et al., 2001). 
Kessels (2013) found that conformity values were associated with lower level of 
epistemological understanding among women and in the total sample consisting of both men 
and women. Further, power values were associated with lower levels of epistemological 
understanding among men.  
Relatedly, the relationship between values and integrative complexity of thought has 
been examined in two previous studies (Tetlock, Peterson, & Berry, 1993; Myyry, 2002). 
Even though epistemological understanding and integrative complexity of thought are not 
identical constructs, they share enough similarities for making assumptions about the 
connections between values and epistemological understanding. These similarities are 
described below in terms of the Kuhn et al. (2000) model.  
Integrative complexity of thought is defined in terms of two cognitive characteristics, 
differentiation and integration (Suedfeld, Tetlock, & Streufert, 1992; Tetlock et al., 1993). 
Differentiation refers to the number of different views that an individual is able and willing to 
perceive and take into account in assessing a certain issue. Differentiation is necessary but 
not sufficient for attaining integration, which refers to developing conceptual connections 
between differentiated views or dimensions. According to Tetlock et al. (1993), characteristic 
of those low in integrative complexity is denying ambiguity and thinking dichotomously. 
This can be seen as resembling the thinking of those at the absolutist level of epistemological 
understanding, who deny the possibility that there could be more than one correct conclusion 
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about the reality (Kuhn et al., 2000). Further, those on moderate levels of integrative 
complexity are able to recognise different views but without means to coordinate the views 
(Tetlock et al., 1993). Similarly, those at the multiplist level of epistemological understanding 
acknowledge that differing views about the same issue can exist, but are unable to see any 
criteria that could be used to compare these views (Kuhn et al., 2000). Finally, those high in 
integrative complexity are capable of accepting different interpretations, and try to 
understand their origins and to deal with their consequences (Tetlock et al., 1993). Likewise, 
those at the evaluativist level of epistemological understanding think that there can be 
alternative valid views about an issue and that these views can be evaluated according to the 
evidence and arguments presented to support the views (Kuhn et al., 2000). 
Tetlock et al. (1993) studied the correlates of integrative complexity by assessing 131 
MBA (master of business administration) students from the University of California. 
Integrative complexity of thought was measured by analysing stories that the respondents 
constructed on the basis of six different pictures. Tetlock et al. found that complexity of 
thought was positively related to openness and creativity and negatively related to social 
compliance and conscientiousness. Further, integrative complexity was positively related to 
power motivation and negatively related to orderliness, responsibility and sensitivity to 
others. According to Myyry (2002) these findings can be seen in the context of the Schwartz 
value model. Creativity fits into the openness to change dimension, whereas social 
compliance matches the conservation dimension. Further, power motivation is part of the 
self-enhancement dimension, whereas responsibility and sensitivity to others belong to the 
self-transcendence dimension. 
In her study of 126 Finnish university students, Myyry (2002) measured integrative 
complexity by analysing the participants’ responses to six different value conflict issues. She 
measured values using the Schwarz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992). Contrary to her 
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expectations, Myyry (2002) found that self-transcendence values correlated positively and 
self-enhancement values negatively with integrative complexity. Surprisingly, openness to 
change and conservation did not correlate significantly with the total score of integrative 
complexity, but these values had significant correlations with a few particular issues.  
Further, values have been found to connect to another cognitive-developmental 
construct, namely, moral judgement development as defined in Kohlberg’s (e.g. 1984) theory 
as a sequence of stages from pre-conventional to post-conventional thinking. According to 
Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma (1999), this development can be described with regard to 
acquiring schemas, of which the post-conventional schema (PCS) represents the highest level 
of thinking that is characterised by seeing moral obligations to be based on shared reciprocal 
ideals that are open to discussion and evaluation. PCS resembles thinking at the evaluativist 
level of epistemological understanding in its seeing moral obligations as open to 
argumentation and scrutiny.  
Generally, reviews of research on the connections between values and moral judgement 
development (as measured in Kohlbergian terms) demonstrate that universalism values have 
the most consistent positive associations with moral judgement development, followed by 
benevolence and self-direction, and that conformity and security have the most consistent 
negative associations (Helkama et al., 2003; Myyry, Juujärvi, & Pesso, 2010). Further, as 
regards Rest’s schemas, Myyry et al. (2010) found that power, achievement, and hedonism 
correlated significantly negatively with PCS, whereas universalism, benevolence, and self-
direction correlated significantly positively with PCS. However, only achievement, 
universalism and self-direction were significant predictors of PCS after controlling for the 
effects of gender, age, empathic concern and perspective taking (Myyry et al., 2010). In 
addition, Lan, Gowing, McMahon, Rieger, and King (2008) found that tradition predicted 
PCS negatively. The results of the above-mentioned studies are presented below in relation to 
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the Schwartz (1992) value dimensions.  
Self-transcendence. Tetlock et al. (1993) found that integrative complexity was 
negatively connected to responsibility and sensitivity to others (compatible with self-
transcendence values), whereas Myyry (2002) found a positive connection between 
complexity and benevolence and universalism value types, as well as self-transcendence 
value dimension. Consistent with the latter findings, universalism and benevolence have been 
found to relate positively to moral judgement development (see reviews in Helkama et al., 
2003; Myyry et al., 2010) and to PCS (Myyry et al., 2010). Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
self-transcendence values will be positively associated with evaluativist epistemological 
understanding (H3). 
Self-enhancement. Kessels (2013) found a negative association between power values 
and evaluativist epistemological understanding (but only among men). However, integrative 
complexity was positively related to power motivation (self-enhancement) in Tetlock et al.’s 
(1993) study and negatively related to power and hedonism value types and self-enhancement 
value dimension in Myyry’s (2002) study. Moreover, Myyry et al. (2010) found that power, 
achievement and hedonism value types were negatively connected to PCS. Thus, it is 
hypothesised that self-enhancement values will be negatively associated with evaluativist 
epistemological understanding (H4).  
Openness to change. Tetlock et al. (1993) observed that integrative complexity was 
positively connected to creativity (openness to change), whereas Myyry (2002) found a 
negative connection between complexity and stimulation value type and openness to change 
value dimension. Further, self-direction value type was found to associate positively with 
moral judgement development (see reviews in Helkama et al., 2003; Myyry et al., 2010) and 
to PCS (Myyry et al., 2010). Based on this, it is hypothesised that openness to change values 
will be positively connected to evaluativist epistemological understanding (H5)  
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Conservation. In Kessels’ (2013) study, conformity values were negatively associated 
with evaluativist epistemological understanding. Tetlock et al. (1993) also found a negative 
connection between integrative complexity and social compliance (conservation), and Myyry 
(2002) found a negative connection between complexity and tradition value type. However, 
the correlation between complexity and conformity value type was positive in Myyry’s 
(2002) study. Further, she found that conservation value dimension was negatively related to 
one issue and positively to another issue measuring integrative complexity. Additionally, 
moral judgement development has been found to have negative associations with conformity 
and security (see reviews in Helkama et al., 2003; Myyry et al., 2010), and tradition has been 
found to connect negatively to PCS (Lan et al., 2008). Therefore, it is hypothesised that 
conservation values will be negatively associated with evaluativist epistemological 
understanding (H6).  
Rational and non-rational truth. To the author’s knowledge, the connection between 
truth-related values and epistemological understanding, complexity of thought or moral 
judgement development has not been studied previously. However, as rational truth values 
motivate the pursuit of theoretical, logical and predictable truth, they seem compatible with 
the evaluativist epistemology. In contrast, non-rational truth values seem incompatible with 
the evaluativist epistemology as they are related to the denial of rationality. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesised that rational truth will be positively (H7) and non-rational truth negatively 
associated with evaluativist epistemological understanding (H8).   
Method 
The respondents were 75 parish staff and other workers. There were 49 females and 23 
males (two respondents did not indicate their gender), ranging in age from 23 to 63, with a 
mean age of 44 (SD = 11.4) (three respondents did not indicate their age). Further, one 
respondent had not responded seriously, and was thus excluded from the analyses. 
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The data was gathered in 2005 using mainly an online questionnaire (some participants 
chose to fill in the paper-and-pencil version of the questionnaire). An e-mail was sent to all 
parish staff and other workers (n = 361) in a particular area in South Finland. The e-mail 
included a description of the objective of the study and a request to participate. The 
participants were told that the study was about their stance towards different ways of thinking 
and action. The response rate was 21 %. 
The questionnaire consisted of three parts of which the first measured epistemological 
understanding and the second measured values. The third part consisted of demographic 
questions.  
Values 
Values were measured using the 40-item Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) 
(Schwartz, Lehmann, & Roccas, 1999; Schwartz et al., 2001). To measure truth-related 
values, six items developed by Wach and Hammer (2003) were also included in the 
questionnaire. In each PVQ item a person is described with two sentences that are compatible 
with one value type. For example, the following item describes a person who values self-
direction: “(S)he thinks it’s important to be interested in things. (S)he is curious and tries to 
understand everything.” The participants are asked to assess “How much like you is this 
person?” by checking one of six options ranging from “not like me at all” to “very much like 
me”. By emphasising what is important to a person the items describe a person’s values and 
not her or his behaviour or traits (Schwartz et al., 1999; Schwartz et al., 2001). A Finnish 
version of the PVQ (Koivula & Verkasalo, 2006) was used in this study. The items developed 
by Wach and Hammer were translated from French to Finnish using back translation 
procedure. An example of an item measuring rational truth is “It is important to her/him to 
find out the causes of things. (S)he likes to think logically and to appeal to reason.” An 
example of an item describing non-rational truth is “(S)he believes that most of the things 
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that take place in life have a hidden meaning. (S)he thinks that nothing happens by chance” 
(approximate translations). 
A summated scale was computed for each value type. Centralised summated scales 
were used in order to follow Schwartz’s (1992) recommendation to control for participants’ 
different use of the response scale. The Cronbach alphas for the value types were: 
benevolence α = .79, universalism α = .83, self-direction α = .62, stimulation α = .72, 
hedonism α = .83, achievement α = .76, power α = .54, security α = .72, conformity α = .68, 
tradition α = .18, non-rational truth α = .30 and rational truth α = .75. Also other researchers 
have reported low alpha coefficients for some of the values types (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995; 
Myyry, 2002). The alphas for the main dimensions (formed by calculating a mean of the 
value types belonging to each main dimension) were: conservation α = .73, self-
transcendence α = .89, openness to change α = .82, self-enhancement α = .81 (including 
hedonism). 
Epistemological understanding 
Epistemological understanding was measured using Kuhn et al.’s (2000) assessment 
instrument of epistemological understanding. The instrument is meant to assess the 
respondent’s level of epistemological understanding in each five domains. Due to its 
simplicity it gives only a rough estimation of this level. The instrument comprises 15 items 
(three for each domain). Each item presents two contradictory statements from a particular 
domain, for example, “Robin believes one book’s explanation of what the atoms are made up 
of. Chris believes another book’s explanation of what the atoms are made up of.” The 
respondent is asked to choose one of the following two options: “only one of the views can 
be right” or “both could have some rightness”. Response that only one view can be right 
indicates the absolutist level. If the respondent chooses the second option, s/he is asked 
whether one of the views could be more right than the other. Choosing the response option 
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“one could not be more right” indicates the multiplist level, whereas a response that “one 
could be more right” indicates the evaluativist level.  
The items of the Kuhn et al. (2000) instrument were translated from English to Finnish 
using back translation procedure. The respondents were assigned to the levels of 
epistemological understanding according to the Kuhn et al. (2000) procedure: a respondent 
was assigned to a particular level when at least two out of three responses in a particular 
domain represented that level. If all three responses represented a different level, the 
respondent was assigned to the middle, multiplist level. There were 14 participants who had 
not followed the instructions when responding to some of the questions. The domains with 
invalid responses were excluded from the analysis, because it was not possible to assign the 
epistemological level. Therefore the number of participants varies across the judgement 
domains. 
In order to calculate the Cronbach’s alphas in each judgement domain, the levels of 
epistemological understanding were given values of 1, 2, and 3 for absolutism, multiplism 
and evaluativism, respectively. The Cronbach’s alphas in each judgement domain were: 
personal taste α = .54, aesthetics α = .65, values α = .28, social truth α = .68 and physical 
truth α = .64.  
Statistical analyses 
Pearson correlations were used to analyse the location of rational truth and non-rational 
truth in the value structure and point-biserial correlations were used to analyse the 
relationship between values and epistemological understanding. For the purposes of the latter 
analysis, the personal epistemology variables were recoded into two groups, the evaluativist 
(scored as 1) and the non-evaluativist (scored as 0). The latter group included both absolutists 
and multiplists because of the low number of the former in most domains of epistemological 
understanding.   
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Results 
Values 
 The means and the hierarchy for the 12 value types are presented in Table 2. The means 
were compared using paired t-tests. When the means of two value types did not differ 
statistically significantly from each other, they were given a shared rank, for example value 
types rational truth, benevolence and self-direction share ranks 2–4. As can be seen in Table 
2, universalism values were the most important and power values the least important for the 
respondents. Of the truth-related values, rational truth was among the four highest ranked 
values, whereas non-rational truth was among the lowest ranked values.  
 
Table 2  
Value hierarchy and descriptive statistics of the 12 value types  
Value type Rank in 
hierarchy 
n Centralised 
mean 
SD Min Max 
Universalism 1 71 1.25 0.17 0.57 1.54 
Rational truth 
2–4 
72 1.20 0.17 0.78 1.53 
Benevolence 71 1.17 0.16 0.65 1.47 
Self-direction 71 1.15 0.13 0.87 1.50 
Security 
5–7 
72 1.05 0.18 0.59 1.50 
Conformity 72 0.99 0.20 0.53 1.47 
Hedonism 72 0.99 0.25 0.25 1.57 
Stimulation 
8–9 
71 0.87 0.21 0.41 1.48 
Tradition 70 0.87 0.16 0.46 1.47 
Achievement 10 72 0.78 0.21 0.31 1.30 
Non-rational truth 11 71 0.73 0.18 0.35 1.28 
Power 12 72 0.68 0.22 0.33 1.22 
 
The value structure and the location of the truth-related values was explored using 
Pearson correlations (see Table 3). In line with the assumptions of the Schwartz (1992) 
model, the correlations between openness to change and conformity values were negative, as 
were the correlations between self-transcendence and self-enhancement values. Not all of 
these correlations were statistically significant, but pointed, however, into the assumed 
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directions. 
Rational truth had the strongest positive correlation with self-direction and the second 
strongest positive, though statistically nonsignificant, correlation with universalism. These 
results indicate that rational truth was located between self-direction and universalism, as 
hypothesised (H1). Non-rational truth did not have statistically significant positive 
correlations with any values and its strongest positive (nonsignificant) correlations were with 
stimulation and tradition. Therefore, the hypothesised location (H2) of non-rational truth 
between security and power was not supported. Finally, as suggested by Wach and Hammer 
(2003), rational truth and non-rational truth were in opposition to each other as indicated by 
the negative correlation between these values. 
 
Table 3  
Pearson correlations between the 12 value types  
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
1. Benevolence            
2. Universalism .44 **           
3. Self-
direction 
-.06 -.04          
4. Stimulation -.12 -.21 -.05         
5. Hedonism -.24 -.21 -.11 .48 **        
6. Achievement -.44 ** -.65 ** .12 .01 -.04       
7. Power -.48 ** -.61 ** .19 .09 .01 .58 **      
8. Security -.13 .01 -.25 * -.49 ** -.20 -.06 -.23 *     
9. Conformity -.08 -.08 -.32 ** -.30 ** -.34 ** -.13 -.07 .22    
10. Tradition .08 -.09 -.26 * -.10 -.09 -.08 -.17 -.04 .12   
11. Non-
rational truth 
-.01 -.04 -.12 .12 .07 -.11 .04 -.26 * -.17 .09  
12. Rational 
truth 
.07 .18 .31 * -.13 -.23 -.03 -.05 -.07 -.21 -.35 ** -.34 ** 
 
Note. Pairwise tests, the number of cases varies from 69 to 72 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. Two-way tests. 
 
17 
 
Epistemological understanding 
The percentages of participants in each level of epistemological understanding across 
the judgement domains are presented in Table 4. According to the percentages, multiplist 
thought was the most prevalent in the domains of taste, aesthetics and values, whereas 
evaluativism was the dominant level in the truth domains. The percentage of the absolutists 
was relatively low in all domains.  
 
Table 4 
 Percentages of epistemological levels in each judgement domain   
Judgement 
domains 
Absolutist Multiplist Evaluativist n 
Taste 3 75 22 67 
Aesthetic  2 85 13 68 
Value  15 50 35 68 
Social truth   0 26 74 69 
Physical truth  23 33 44 66 
 
Values and epistemological understanding 
The results of the point-biserial correlation analyses are presented in Table 5 following 
the order of the hypotheses. The self-transcendence value dimension did not statistically 
significantly correlate with epistemological understanding and neither did the benevolence 
and universalism value types, which form the self-transcendence dimension (H3). The self-
enhancement dimension correlated significantly positively with the evaluativist level in the 
domain of social truth judgements as did the value types achievement and power, whereas 
hedonism did not correlate significantly in any domain (H4). The openness to change 
dimension correlated significantly positively with the evaluativist level in the domain of 
values. Of the value types forming this dimension, self-direction correlated significantly 
positively with evaluativist epistemology in the domains of values and social and physical 
truth, whereas stimulation did not correlate significantly with epistemological understanding 
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(H5). All conservation values correlated statistically significantly negatively with the 
evaluativist level of epistemological understanding in one or more domains. Conformity did 
so in the domains of personal taste, aesthetics, and social and physical truth; security in the 
domain of physical truth; and tradition in the domain of values. The conservation dimension 
correlated negatively with the evaluativist level in the domains of values, and social and 
physical truth (H6). Rational truth and non-rational truth values did not correlate statistically 
significantly with epistemological understanding (H7 and H8).  
 
Table 5  
Point-biserial correlations between values and evaluativist epistemology 
 Taste Aesthetic Value Social  
truth 
Physical  
truth 
Values types           
Benevolence -.09  .07  .15  -.13  .11  
Universalism .04  .03  .18  -.18  .01  
Self-direction .24  .22  .26 * .25 * .39 ** 
Stimulation -.00  -.03  .09  .05  .01  
Hedonism .13  .02  .12  .12  .05  
Achievement .04  .00  -.12  .25 * .07  
Power .01  .02  -.10  .27 * -.02  
Security -.03  -.03  -.10  -.24  -.31 * 
Conformity -.26 * -.28 * -.16  -.29 * -.29 * 
Tradition -.16  -.09  -.32 ** .03  .14  
Non-rational truth .00  .10  -.09  -.06  .02  
Rational truth .21  .13  .06  .16  .14  
Value dimensions           
Self-transcendence -.03  .06  .20  -.17  .06  
Openness to change .16  .15  .25 * .17  .21  
Self-enhancement .03  .01  -.13  .29 * .03  
Conservation -.23  -.20  -.25 * -.26 * -.28 * 
 
Note. Pairwise tests, the number of cases varies from 63 to 67. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. Two-way tests. 
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Discussion 
The main goal of this study has been to understand the role of different values in the 
development of epistemological understanding. Together with the results from previous 
integrative complexity and moral judgement development studies, the present study gives 
insights about the relationships between values and the development of thought also in a 
more general level. 
As regards self-transcendence, previous studies (Myyry, 2002; Tetlock et al., 1993) 
have yielded contradictory results about its associations with integrative complexity. 
However, when taking into account also the results of several moral judgement development 
studies (see Helkama et al., 2003; Myyry et al., 2010), it seems that self-transcendence values 
are more consistently positively than negatively related to the more developed forms of 
thinking, and therefore, a positive association was expected also in the present study. 
However, it was found that self-transcendence values were not statistically significantly 
associated with epistemological understanding.  
Unexpectedly, self-enhancement was found to be positively associated with evaluativist 
epistemology, but only in the domain of social truth. More specifically, power values were 
positively associated with epistemological understanding, which is in line with Tetlock et 
al.’s (1993) results concerning integrative complexity, but contradicts those of Kessels’ 
(2013) study on epistemological understanding, Myyry’s (2002) study on integrative 
complexity and Myyry et al.’s (2010) study on moral schemas. Achievement values were 
connected to a more developed level of epistemological understanding in the present study, 
whereas in previous studies achievement was not associated with the development of thinking 
(Tetlock et al., 1993; Myyry, 2002) or was negatively associated (Myyry et al., 2010). Taken 
together, these results might lead us to suggest that self-transcendence and self-enhancement 
values connect to the development of thinking only in particular contexts, domains of 
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knowledge or areas of development of thinking.  
How could we interpret the finding that endorsing self-enhancement was related to 
evaluativist epistemology only in the social truth domain? Maybe evaluativist thinking in the 
domain of social truth could help attaining power and achievement in social world, in which 
these values are likely to be pursued. An individual striving for these values might also be 
more motivated in thinking about the nature of social knowledge, which could lead to having 
more developed epistemological understanding in this domain.  
In line with what was hypothesised, the openness to change main dimension and self-
direction values were found to associate positively with evaluativist epistemology. Congruent 
with this, Tetlock et al. (1993) found that values compatible with openness to change were 
positively connected to the complexity of thought. Self-direction and moral judgement 
development have also been found to be positively connected (see reviews in Helkama et al., 
2003; Myyry et al., 2010) as have self-direction and PCS (Myyry et al., 2010). On the 
contrary, in Myyry’s (2002) study the openness to change dimension was negatively 
associated with the complexity of thought, as was stimulation, whereas in the present study 
stimulation was not connected to epistemological understanding. Due to these inconsistent 
findings, no straightforward conclusions about the openness to change values can be made. 
However, it seems that self-direction is quite consistently connected to more developed 
thinking, whereas stimulation either connects to less developed thinking or is unconnected to 
levels of thinking.  
The findings were the most consistent for the conservation values, of which all 
(conformity, security, and tradition) correlated negatively with evaluativist epistemology, as 
expected. Also Kessels (2013) found a negative association between conformity values and 
evaluativist epistemological understanding. Further, in the Tetlock et al. (1993) study those 
higher on social compliance (compatible with conservation values) were lower on integrative 
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complexity and in Myyry (2002)’s study tradition values were negatively associated with the 
complexity of thought, as was the conservation main dimension. However, in Myyry’s (2002) 
study the conservation dimension had also a positive connection to complexity as did the 
conformity value type. As regards moral judgement development, conformity and security 
have been found to associate negatively to moral judgement development (see reviews in 
Helkama et al., 2003; Myyry et al., 2010), and also a negative association has been found 
between tradition and PCS (Lan et al., 2008). Thus, generally, conservation values seem to 
connect to less developed thinking quite consistently.  
 To sum up, value dimension openness to change–conservation was found to be 
associated with epistemological understanding more consistently than the self-enhancement–
self-transcendence dimension. However, because of the cross-sectional design of this study it 
is not possible to make firm conclusions about the direction of causality, i.e. whether the 
direction actually is from values to epistemological understanding or vice versa. Future 
studies should address this question by using longitudinal designs.  
Surprisingly, the truth-related value types, rational and non-rational truth, were not 
statistically significantly associated with epistemological understanding. It is possible that 
these correlations did not reach statistical significance because of the small sample size, but it 
is equally possible that truth-related values simply are not connected to epistemological 
understanding. As regards rational truth, the former interpretation may be more plausible 
considering that the associations of rational truth were consistently positive (as hypothesised) 
across the judgement domains of epistemological understanding, though statistically 
nonsignificant. The reliability for non-rational truth was quite low (α = .30), and therefore 
future studies may consider reformulating at least some of these items. 
Further, because of the small sample size, taking into account the effects of background 
variables was not possible. Therefore, it would be advisable to use larger samples in future 
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studies to further elaborate the role of different values for individuals’ epistemological 
understanding. It would also be worthwhile to investigate the associations of values with 
different components of epistemological understanding, such as trust in different sources of 
knowledge and justification for knowing.    
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